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Abstract 
The people of Niger Delta have suffered several years of negligence 
and marginalism from the exploration of petroleum and distribution of its 
products by multinational oil companies and the government. This has 
necessitated attacks from the locals on government forces, oil workers, and 
oil installation sites as a means of expressing their grievances. The oil crisis 
in the region has led to the disruption of oil exploration and reduction of 
revenues accruing to the state from the sales of oil. These crises have led to 
the multiplication of several criminal vices that has turned the region into a 
state of disarray. The military and the militants are currently benefiting 
from the booming business of illegal bunkering, pipeline vandalism, and 
diversion of refined petroleum products running through the pipes from the 
refineries. This paper focuses on examining the history of oil exploration, 
origin, and consequences of the oil crisis in the Niger Delta, and how the 
government can put an end to this menace. 
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Introduction 
Among the 20 major deltas in the world, the Niger Delta is ranked as 
one of the largest wetlands, Africa‘s largest delta, and possibly the richest in 
the world in terms of oil and gas reserves (Badmus, 2010; Fagbadebo & 
Akinola, 2010; Ogbonna & Ebimobowei, 2012). The oil industry is a 
blessing to the Nigerian economy and have contributed the lion share to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounting for the bulk of Federal 
Government revenue and foreign exchange earnings since early 1970 
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(Nwoba & Abah, 2017; Bodo, 2018). The Oil and Gas sector is the mainstay 
of Nigeria’s economy, contributing more than 90% of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings and 83% of its GDP (Ogbeifun, 2014; Nwoba & Abah, 
2017). Between 2000 to 2009, the price of crude oil rose from $13 per barrel 
to a high rate of $125 per barrel, thereby increasing the Nigeria’s annual 
budget expenditure between the period under review from N470 billion to 
N2.676 trillion (Ogbonna & Ebimobowei, 2012). Within this same period, 
the total recurrent expenditure increased as a result of increase in salaries and 
expansion of government ministries and agencies (Ogbonna & Ebimobowei, 
2012). 
Multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria has generated huge revenues for the Federal Government of Nigeria 
(FGN) through the taxes, royalties, and levies paid for the production and 
supply of energy running into billions of dollars (USD). It is already a 
known fact that Nigeria depends on the oil and gas industry for more than 
90% of its export earnings and about 80% of government revenue (Ibori, 
2009). The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) on their own 
part, through their operations in the onshore and shallow water, contributed 
about $900 million (N272.72 billion) in taxes and royalties in 2018. On the 
other hand, the Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company 
(SNEPCo), which operates in the offshore deep water, contributed about 
$800 million (N242.42 billion). In 2018 alone, Nigerian Liquefied Natural 
Gas (NLNG) paid approximately $398 million (N120.61 billion) in income 
tax to the FGN (SPDC, 2019). Despite these huge returns into the 
government purse, the people of the Niger Delta still suffer from lack and 
want with other severe consequences (Akpan, 2014; Bodo, 2018; Bodo, 
2019). Ironically, despite this tremendous natural resource endowments, the 
Niger Delta region houses one of the extreme situations of poverty and 
underdevelopment (Odalonu & Eronmhonsele, 2015). Consequently, the 
region is characterized by low Infrastructural development and an 
unemployment level of over 85% (Odalonu & Eronmhonsele, 2015). For a 
region that accounts for over 80% of Nigeria‘s oil production with over 600 
oil fields, 5,284 oil wells, 10 oil and gas export terminals, 275 flow stations, 
10 gas plants and massive liquefied natural gas (Ibaba, 2009; Aghedo, 2011 
Odalonu & Eronmhonsele, 2015), basic social amenities are said to very 
limited, falling below the national average in all measures or indicators of 
development (Ibaba, 2005; Ejovi, Ebie, & Akpokighe, 2014; Odalonu & 
Eronmhonsele, 2015). 
Oil disputes between Cross River State and Akwa Ibom State, 
Rivers State and Akwa Ibom State, and Rivers State and Bayelsa State over 
ownership of oil blocks resulted to violence and conflicts between the host 
communities within the oil blocks in these states (Akpan, 2014). Several 
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lives have been lost on the part of the stakeholders (Multinational oil 
operators, government, host communities) as there had been cases of 
missing military officers that were assigned on a special assignment in the 
region; oil company workers had been kidnapped and killed on many 
occasions; and many oil facilities has been shut down permanently in 
Ogoniland at the expense of the government (Akinola, 2008; Akinbi, 2012). 
The host communities in the Niger Delta has the lion share of these losses: 
the killing of more than 2,500 persons in Odi community in Bayelsa State 
on the 20th of November, 1999, by the Nigerian military; the killing of four 
prominent Ogoni leaders by the locals, and the subsequent illegal trial and 
execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni sons by the military 
government (Osaghe, 1995; Nannen, 1995; Rafiu, 2008). 
Thereafter, there were declarations of independent kingdoms by 
different aggrieved parties and societies, which were presumed to be 
separate and distinct from Nigeria (Aghalino, 2001). Subsequently the 
formation of different angry militant groups followed (Akinbi, 2012; 
Aghalino, 2012). These militant groups used different approaches to draw 
the attention of the multinational companies and government to their 
plights. From 2006 to 2009, all hell broke loose in the region and beyond as 
over 90 billion naira was amassed by these militants through payment of 
ransom from the kidnapped victims, with other vices like illegal bunkering 
and vandalism of pipeline that were being perpetrated (Ukelegbe, 2006; 
Akinbi, 2012; Bodo,2019). 
This paper reviews the genesis of oil crisis, the extent of the crisis, 
and the possible solutions in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
 
The History Of Oil Exploration In Nigeria 
The beginning of colonial rule in Nigeria coincided with the 
expansion of oil exploration in most countries of the world. There was high 
demand for oil and other lubricants due to the development of the 
combustion engine in the 1890’s (Udosen, Etok & George, 2009). At the 
same time, there was increased need for military ships to protect the island 
following World War I (Collins, 2018). The British government decided to 
explore their colonies for oil resources to meet up the demands back home. 
Nigeria, being one of those colonies, was explored first for bitumen, coal, 
and finally oil (Udosen et al., 2009). Oil exploration and exploitation in 
Nigeria is believed to have started far back 1903 with the British Mineral 
Survey Company (World Bank, 2000; Collins, 2018). Much later, around 
1908, the German surveyors of the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation began 
prospecting for Tar Sand deposit in Araromi in the present Ondo State 
(Udosen, Etok & George, 2019; Aniefiok et al.,2013). 
By 1914, the British government passed the first mineral oil 
European Scientific Journal December 2019 edition Vol.15, No.36 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
144 
ordinance that was controlled solely by them as they excluded non British 
subjects from having right of oil exploration in Nigeria (Aniefiok, 2013; 
Collin, 2018). However, these pioneering efforts ended with the outbreak of 
the World War I in 1914. After several years later, petroleum exploration 
began again in 1938, when Shell D’Arcy (a consortium of Iranian Oil 
Company that later became British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell) was 
granted a sole ownership right over the whole country (Aniefiok et al., 
2013; Udosen et al., 2009). Again, the World War II that started between 
1939 to1945 terminated the oil exploration activities by Shell D’Arcy. Oil 
exploration in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta resumed in 1946 after World War 
II with several exploratory wells as the search for oil persisted. After years 
of continuous search with a reported investment of over $30 million spent 
by SPDC, the first recorded commercial quantity of petroleum was 
discovered at Oloibiri and Afam oil fields in the Niger Delta in 1956 
(Udosen et al., 2009; Bodo, 2019). 
There were reports that SPDC was successful in oil discovery in 
other settlements like Bomu oil field in Ogoniland. However, such findings 
were only reported at a later date in 1958 (Aniefiok et al., 2013; Bodo, 
2019). The giant Bomu oil field was reported as having an estimated 
ultimate recovery (EUR) of 0.311 billion of barrels (BB) of oil and a total 
of 0.608 billion of barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) including gas, making 
this oil field a massive treasure to the operating company (SPDC) and the 
Nigerian government (Vassiliou, 2009; Aniefiok, et al., 2013). Mobil 
Producing (Nigeria) Ltd, a subsidiary of American Socony– Mobil Oil 
Company, was also at the background working their way into Nigeria.  
Thus, they obtained license to explore for oil and began operations in 
Nigeria in 1955 under the name Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated 
which was later incorporated as Mobil Producing Nigeria on June 16, 1969 
(Aniefiok et al., 2013). In 1958, SPDC started oil production and export 
from the Oloibiri field in Rivers State (presently in Bayelsa State) at the rate 
of 5,100 barrels per day and about 10,500 barrels the following year 
(Udosen, et al., 2009). 
By 1960, the petroleum sector was beginning to gain weight in 
transforming the Nigerian economy and the dominant source of revenue 
(which was agriculture) began to lose relevant, as government was focused 
on expanding the oil and gas sector (Adomakai & Sheate, 2004). As a 
result, the Nigerian government abandoned other sources of revenues (like 
agriculture, manufacturing, creative arts and entrepreneurship) that was 
already giving the country recognition overseas (Adomakai & Shaete, 
2004). It was not a surprise that immediately this policy was introduced, 
other multinational oil and gas companies started coming to Nigeria to do 
business and make as much profit as possible why the offer lasted. In 
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addition, non-British firms were also granted license to explore oil 
(Aniefiok, et al., 2013; Bodo, 2019). Subsequently, Mobil came in 1955, 
Texaco Overseas Nigeria Petroleum Company Unlimited in 1961, Amoseas 
in 1961, Gulf Oil Company in 1961 (now Chevron), Société Africaine des 
Pétroles (SAFRAP) in 1962 (which later became Elf Nigeria Limited in 
1974), Tennessee Nigeria Limited (Tenneco) in 1962, Azienda Generale 
Italiana Petroli (AGIP) in 1962, ENI in 1964, Philips Oil Company in 1964, 
and Pan Ocean Oil Corporation in 1972 (Poindexter, et al., 2008; Udosen et 
al., 2009; Aniefiok, et al., 2013). These multinational oil and gas companies 
within few years in Nigeria’s oil business became richer than some 
countries in the world today. They grew from small start-up companies to 
oil giants in the world today. Thus, they recorded remarkable successes in 
oil and gas exploration and production in both onshore and offshore fields 
in the Niger Delta (Doyle et al., 2008; Obaje, 2009; Aniefiok et al., 2013). 
For example, in 1984, Nigerian Agip Oil Company started its operations in 
Ibocha-Obiafu axis of Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni Local Government Area of 
Rivers State. Currently, they (AGIP Oil Company) have built the largest 
gas plant in the entire West Africa in Omoku and have spread almost to the 
entire Niger Delta region of the South-South. One thing is clear for all to 
see, oil business in Nigeria is good for the multinational oil and gas 
companies, as their stations where company machines and staffs resides, 
have been transformed into little heavens on earth (Bodo, 2019; Bodo & 
David, 2018; Bodo,2018). 
As oil exploration progressed in Nigeria, the Nigeria Government 
became aware that they were outsmarted in the oil business and decided to 
create the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) Inspectorate in 1970. 
Later on, Nigeria joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1971 (Aniefiok, et al., 2013). The first national oil 
company, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC), was created in 
1971 and it later became the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) in 1977 (Aniefiok, et al., 2013). The Federal Government of 
Nigeria went on to take control of the country’s petroleum industry by 
nationalizing BP’s holding completely in 1979, and Shell–BP became Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) in the same period 
(Aniefiok et al., 2013). Also, SPDC was in-charge of producing about 39 
per cent of the nation's oil and remains the major producer in the Nigeria’s 
petroleum industry (Obaje, 2019; Bodo, 2019). In January 1979, Nigeria 
attained its all-time peak in petroleum production at the rate of 2.44 million 
barrels per day, with millions of dollars going into the government accounts 
daily from oil sales (Udosen, et al., 2009; Bodo,2019). 
The Niger Delta region is truly blessed and it is reported to have 31 
giant oil and gas fields. This is with an estimated ultimate recoverable oil of 
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more than 500 million barrels that produces in excess of 1 million barrels a 
day (Obaje, 2009; Pearson, 1970). Vassiliou (2009) reported that 17 of the 
giant oil and gas production fields are located offshore and some of them 
include Bomu (which is cited in Kegbara Dere in Gokana in Rivers State), 
Oso, Ubit, Assan, Meren, Abo, Bonga, Bonga Southwest and Agbami, etc. 
(Obaje, 2009; Genova,2007). 
The Niger Delta oil is not only very important for the survival of the 
Nigeria state but also to other nations of the world (Asuni, 2009). The hike 
in oil prices at the gas stations around the world by January, 2006, was a 
clear indication that the activities of militant groups in the region have 
affected international oil supplies (Asuni, 2009). By 2008, the cost of oil 
was $147 per barrel, at a time when oil production in the Niger Delta was 
down by a quarter (Asuni,2009). 
 
Genesis Of The Crisis In The Niger Delta Region Of Nigeria 
Ever since oil was discovered and reported officially in Nigeria in 
1956, it has been a source of strife and violence (Vangham, 2011). The 
crisis in the Niger Delta region did not start today. Even before Nigeria was 
officially incorporated into the British Empire in 1900, the Niger Delta has 
a long history of clashes and external commercial activities with the outside 
world primarily through the palm oil and export of slaves before the British 
banned the slave trade (Udosen et al., 2009; Francis, Lapin & Rossiasco, 
2011). The Niger Delta people are majorly into agriculture even before the 
British colonialism. Palm oil from the region was exported in exchange for 
the importation of manufactured goods. Port Harcourt Port in the Niger 
Delta supported active trading, importation, and exportation of goods 
during this period. Yet the major ethnic groups profited above the minor 
groups within the Niger Delta. Also, the British government during the 
colonial era failed to address the neglect of the minority ethnic groups and 
that has persisted even after the Nigerian independence in 1960 (Frederick 
et al., 2013). 
According to history, the Royal Niger Company was in-charge of 
business in the Niger Delta region (Aniefiok et al., 2013). This company 
monopolised governance and trade of the region, and they were very hostile 
within the period of its exploitative practices that resulted in an attack on its 
headquarters in Akassa by the king of Brass in 1895 (Udosen, Etok & 
George, 2009). The Royal Niger Company later sold all its asset and areas 
of dominance to the British Government in 1900 (Aniefiok et al., 2013). 
The people in the Niger delta region of Niger Delta (that was later called 
the Oil Rivers Protectorate, and then incorporated into the Southern 
Protectorate that was amalgamated in 1914 into a unified Nigeria) had 
always agitated against the unfair treated meted to them (Udosen et al., 
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2009). The people of Niger Delta have always been outspoken against all 
forms of marginalisation and ill treatments. For as far back as 1929, the 
women of Aba were provoked by rumours of a new income tax and came 
into direct and violent confrontation with the police. As a result, more than 
fifty women were killed in the riots (Bodo & David, 2018; Francis et al., 
2011; ICG,2006). 
The ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta began to express their 
concerns even during the transition to independence in the 1950s; however, 
the first major episode of militancy in the Niger Delta occurred in February 
1966, when Isaac Boro (Ijaw born in Oloibiri), a leader of the Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force (NDVF), declared the independence of the Niger Delta 
People’s Republic, which consisted of the present day Rivers and Bayelsa 
States. Thus, he called the multinational oil companies to negotiate directly 
with his government (Udosen et al., 2009). After Boro’s failed attempt in 
liberating his people, the Niger Delta became increasingly marginalized 
from the political and economic systems with the progressive degradation 
of the environment due to unsustainable oil exploitation and 
impoverishment. This increased the minorities’ feelings of frustration 
against the federal government (Ebeku, 2001; Bodo, 2018; Bodo, 2019; 
Udosen et al., 2009). 
By 1979, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) had established 
the oil deposits as a national asset ensuring that everywhere oil exploitation 
is operational, is solely government property and business depriving the 
host communities any form of ownership and control (Asuni, 2009). This 
kind of arrangement in the 1990s had left the people of Niger Delta 
abandoned, leaving the development of the region in the hands of strangers 
(the operating oil companies) at an era when Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) was not part of their operation (Asuni, 2009). In this 
same period, a tribe (the Ogonis) in the Niger Delta was on the verge of 
extinction by the operations of SPDC on their land. Luckily, a bold 
knowledgeable leader (Ken Saro Wiwa) emerged among them to save his 
people from their certain doom (Bodo, 2019). The level of awareness of the 
local communities in the Niger Delta based on the benefits accruing from 
oil to the FGN and SPDC has necessitated several attempts of bribery of 
willing individuals from the region to sabotage the Ogoni struggle for 
fairness and justice (Bodo, 2018; Bodo,2019). In the 1990s, Ken Saro-
Wiwa brought the plights of the Ogoni people to the knowledge of the 
world through Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
which adopted a non-violent approach using organised and civilised 
protests as well as persuasive appeals to the government and the 
international community (Bodo, 2018). Ken Saro Wiwa transcends the 
Niger Delta struggle to a level of knowledge and intellectual discussion. 
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This involves creating awareness in the entire region of how blessed they 
were, what has gone out of their communities (profits in billions of US 
dollars), and the consequences (poverty and death) that were left behind 
(David & Bodo, 2019; Bodo & David, 2018; Bodo, 2019; Asuni, 2009; 
Saro-Wiwa, 1992, 1995). Through Ken, the perpetrators of environmental 
pollution were identified as the oil operating companies. He helped in 
funding MOSOP and in 1990 published the Ogoni Bill of Rights (Asuni, 
2009; Bodo, 2019). 
 
Ken Saro Wiwa attributed the injustice to the fact that the Ogonis 
were minorities and accused the majority groups of using their oil wealth to 
develop their areas at the expense of the areas that produce the oil 
(Osaghae, 1995). It has been reported that the cities of Lagos and Abuja 
were built with petrodollars from the Niger Delta (Bodo, 2019). The Ogoni 
demanded better treatment from the multinational oil companies as basic 
amenities were lacking in the region. Many believed that the Ogonis were 
too bold in their demands in 1990s, as some other ethnic groups in the 
region where suffering from worst conditions, but had giving up hopes of a 
better life and settled with their fate. In a message to the Ogonis, the then 
military administrator of Rivers State, Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Komo, 
made similar statement to validate this assertion when he said, “they don’t 
have the monopoly of petroleum in Nigeria and cannot make demands that 
other (oil producing) communities are not  making” (Osaghae, 1995). The 
Ogonis surprised even the military government with their demands, as no 
oil-producing community in Nigeria has gone to the extent of exerting the 
right to self- determination like the Ogonis did in the 1990s (Osaghae, 1995; 
Bodo, 2019). 
With the demands for justice being turned down by the government 
and multinational oil companies, the Ogoni youths aggressively took 
matters into their hands by openly confronting the government forces and 
oil company operatives on their land. The government had always deployed 
the army, navy, and paramilitary police as a means of dealing with protests 
(Udosen et al., 2009). Consequently, it was reported that in order to shut 
down the Ogoni struggle in the 1990s, the government instigated violent 
conflicts between the Ogonis and the neighbouring Andoni communities 
between July and September, 1993. Furthermore,  the Okrikas in Port 
Harcourt was also involved in the conflict in December that same year, 
where lives were lost and properties destroyed for no apparent reason 
(Osaghae, 1995). When the leaders from both sides met to resolve the crisis 
between them, they all agreed there was no issue that would have 
necessitated the clash in the first place, thereby giving the assumption of an 
external hand being responsible for the clash (the FGN and SPDC was 
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suspected). The Ogoni militancy had reported that at various war fronts 
between the clashing communities, they met soldiers fighting with them 
with machine guns and AK47 riffles, as against their knives and cutlasses 
(Osaghae, 1995; Bodo,2019). 
Moreover, there were reported cases of bribery from the FGN and 
SPDC, where some Ogonis who were later referred to as vultures were paid 
to bear false witness against Ken Saro Wiwa and the other MOSOP leaders 
(Bodo, 2019). In all cases of bribery, these Ogonis later came out, after they 
realised that Ken Saro Wiwa had been passed a death sentence because of 
their testimonies against him, to confess that they were giving monies by 
government representatives to give false statements in court. Soon after, the 
Ogoni struggle led to the dead of four prominent Ogoni leaders (Albert 
Badey, Theophilus Orage, Samuel Orage and Edward Kobani), Ken Saro 
Wiwa, and eight others. Furthermore, this resulted to the departure of SPDC 
in 1993 from Ogoniland (Bodo, 2019). In 1995, Ken Saro Wiwa was 
charged with incitement to murder and was executed by the Nigerian 
military government (Vaughan, 2011; Bodo, 2019). The Ogonis openly 
accused SPDC of orchestrating the murder of Ken and the eight other. Also, 
SPDC had also disregarded their involvement in the murder of Ken Saro 
Wiwa by stating that the allegations being made were false and were 
without merit (Bodo, 2019; SPDC, 2019). In 2009, SPDC agreed to pay 
£9.6 million to the affected families as an out of court settlement of a legal 
action which accused it of collaborating in the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa 
and the other Ogoni leaders (Vangham, 2011). The killing of Ken Saro 
Wiwa set the Niger Delta region into crisis, as direct attacks against the 
FGN and the multinational oil companies became common (Bodo, 2019). 
Today, the Ken Saro Wiwa-led uprising in the 1990s has given voices to 
other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. 
Ken Saro Wiwa brought the Ogoni Struggle and problems faced by 
the Niger Delta people to the knowledge of the entire world (Bodo, 2018; 
Bodo, 2019). The environmental awareness among other ethnic groups in 
the region has increased the demands for local ownership of lands and oil 
resources (Gimah & Bodo, 2019a). The different ethnic groups started 
waging wars against the oil operators in their communities. It was reported 
that three successive major violent ethnic clashes erupted in the Warri area 
in 1997, 1999, and 2003 (Francis et al., 2011; Udosen et al., 2009). By 
December 1998, a youth conference was held in Kaiama which led to the 
Kaiama Declaration that crystallized into the Ijaw struggle for resource 
control (Francis et al., 2011; Udosen et al., 2009). In 2004, the situation in 
the region worsened as the Militant leader Dokubo Asari announces 
“Operation Locust Feast” and declares an “all-out-war” against the Nigerian 
State. Almost within this period, the violent conflicts in communities of 
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Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states was on the increase to an estimate of about 
150 per year, and over fifty armed groups with an estimated 20,000 to 
25,000 armed youths were already operating in the region (UNDP, 2006; 
Francis et al., 2011; Udosen et al., 2009). Soon after, a booming business of 
Hostage-taking and oil bunkering became the order of the day, with attacks 
on oil facilities occurring on a daily basis (Bodo, 2019). Militant groups like 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), headed by 
Tom Polo, the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) by Ateke Tom, and the Niger 
Delta Strike Force (NDSF) headed by Farah Dagogo and many others 
began to emerge (Asuni,2009). 
The militants expressed their intent for oil autonomy by loading a 
large number of boats and barges through illegal bunkering. The refined 
petroleum products and crude oil are transported through ships and barges 
and are sold in the high sea. The crude oil is sold at very low prices; when 
the price per barrel was 26 USD, as at 2003, it was sold for 7USD 
(Okumagba, 2009; Obi, 2009). By 2004, it was sold at about 15USD per 
barrel (Okumagba, 2009; Obi, 2009). The government inability to put an 
end to the activities of the militant groups has also contributed to the 
growing crisis in the region. 
 
The Outcome Of The Oil Crisis In The Niger Delta Region  
 
Poor Standard Of Living 
Despite the enormous natural endowment and wealth that has been 
generated from the region, the Niger Delta settlement is always referred to 
as the poorest and least developed in Africa (Bodo, 2019). According Ken 
Saro Wiwa (1995), the Ogonis are hardworking and industrious people that 
engage in farming and fishing activities and had lived happily for many 
decades before the discovery of oil on their land. Despite that, they are 
impoverished because of the destruction of their livelihood. The Niger 
Delta environment has been described as a beautiful countryside that was a 
source of fresh air and green vegetation; but unfortunately, many years of 
oil exploration has made death and food scarcity the reality of the region 
(Bodo & David, 2018). The rivers and lands have been massively polluted 
by the activities of the oil multinational companies for decades (David, 
Bodo & Gimah, 2019). With the lands for agricultural cultivation and rivers 
for fishing activities, now contaminated by petroleum spills (that would take 
a minimum of 30 years to restore the ecosystem back to survivable or 
habitable level), the people are left with nothing to depend on (Bodo,2019). 
The people of Niger Delta had surplus food for exportation in the 
pre-colonial and colonial eras, as theirs lands and rivers had always given 
them all they need to live as a prosperous people (Saro-Wiwa, 1995). 
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Today, a region that has been described as been so blessed, now houses the 
poorest people in the country. These are people with no job or occupation 
because their primary occupation of fishing and farming has been taken 
away from them (David & Bodo, 2019). Currently, in the region, food 
scarcity is a common occurrence with lack of social amenities such good 
roads, adequate hospitals, safe drinking water, electricity, schools, and 
markets (Bodo, 2019). The people now lived in polluted slums and squalors 
that is highly militarised to keep them dumb and voiceless as the 
government continue to explore the oil on their lands at the expense of the 
locals that is on the verge of extinction (Bodo, 2019; Darah, 2011). 
 
Youth Restiveness 
The definition of a youth could differ from one geographical area to 
another because it is determined by the society. A youth is always 
characterized by excessive energy that needs to be exerted which, if not 
guarded, could result into negative tendencies. They are described as being 
neither teenagers nor children (Ndu, 2000; Yusuf, 2001). Adewuyi (2008) 
saw youths as people between ages 15 to 24 years. In Nigeria, the National 
Youth Service Scheme (NYSC) regard young people as being within the 
age limit of 30 years. The N-Power programme of the Federal Government 
of Nigeria sees a youth as one that is within the age limit of 35 years (Igbo 
& Ikpa, 2013). Realistically, in the Niger Delta and even in Nigeria at large, 
one is regarded as a youth as long as he or she is unmarried, and as an adult 
when married, irrespective of the age of that person. 
Youth restiveness has been used as tool by the youth to get what 
they want from the relevant authority. The Niger Delta people have been 
reported to be once peaceful people that have been provoked severally and 
pushed to the wall beyond bearable limits. Thus, they only retaliate against 
their oppressors out of pains and to avert their death and extinction (Bodo, 
2019). The consequences of several oil crisis and disagreement between the 
people and government had led to formation of several movements such as 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta 
People Volunteer Force (NDPFF), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). There 
have also been multiplications of several countless cult groups that have 
laid claims of some abandon oil stations in the region (Bodo, 2019). 
Killings and burning of houses is now a daily occurrence in the region as 
attacks between the cults groups and the military has led many to desert 
their home towns to seek refuge elsewhere (Bodo, 2019; Bodo, 2018; 
Okolie-Osemene, 2015). 
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Politicizing of Environmental Issues 
The pollution of the Niger Delta region is no longer news, as the 
entire region suffers from air, water, and land pollution at a very high 
concentration (Onosode, 2003; NDES, 1997; Bodo, 2018; Famuyiwa, 1998; 
Eromosele, 1998; Orubu et al., 2004). The Nigerian government have also 
on several occasion recognised this fact and promised to addressed the 
challenges on the region with immediate effect (Bodo, 2019). 
Unfortunately, these statements by the government have been regarded as 
untrue and as a deceit by the government; a ploy that was used to calm 
down or delay the pressures from the people and neglect them in their 
sufferings (Bodo, 2018). Every election year, the proposed clean up of the 
region is usually the selling point on the lips of most politicians from the 
zone (their own representatives) and even those outside the zone (Bodo, 
2018; Bodo, 2019). A typical example is the case of the Ogoni people 
where in 2011, the United Nation Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
recommended immediate remediation of the entire Ogoni ecosystem (a 
process that will take at least 30 years to restore the lost habitat) after 
thorough Environmental Impact Assessment of the land (UNEP, 2011). The 
same government that invited UNEP urgently to Ogoniland to assess the 
environmental conditions of the land have refused to implement the urgent 
recommendation for the immediate clean up of the land (Bodo & 
Ukpong,2018). 
 
Unemployment and Crimes 
With the original source of livelihood of fishing and farming 
destroyed, the majority of the people in the region are unemployed and poor 
(Bodo & David, 2018). The majority of the youths have embraced new 
trade of illegal bunkering, kidnapping, arm robbery, and prostitution (for 
the women) as a means of survival (Bodo, 2019). The unfortunate scenario 
in this entire eventuality is that the people involved in these businesses 
found it profiting than their former lost trade (Bodo, 2018; Bodo, 2019). It is 
believed that this new business could pay those involved hundreds of 
thousands naira weekly, making it impossible for them to quit the trade 
despite its hazardous nature (Bodo, 2018; Bodo, 2019; Gimah & Bodo, 
2019a).  Oil business of illegal bunkering in the Niger Delta has further 
increased the destruction of the ecosystem in the region as the operators of 
this illegal oil business are not environmentally literate about their actions 
on their environment (Gimah &Bodo, 2019b). Billions of naira has been 
reported to be realised from private individuals, operating companies, and 
state governments in the region on ransom payments on kidnapped victims 
to militants groups (Okolie-Osemene, 2015; Bodo, 2019). Unfortunately, 
the military that were sent to checkmate these criminal vices are fully 
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involved with the locals in sharing the loots from these businesses 
(Bodo,2019). 
 
Bribery and Corruption 
It is believed that the cleanup of Ogoniland is being stalled by 
bribery and corruption, as the leadership of the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) has been reported to have been divided over 
their involvement in the exercise (Bodo, 2019). SPDC has been severally 
accused by the Ogoni people for dividing the people and initiating crisis 
among themselves by bribing some of the corrupt locals (Bodo, 2018). In 
1995, during the Ogoni uprising, SPDC was accused of bribing the four 
Ogoni leaders that was later killed by mob action and for collaborating with 
military government in the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others 
(Bodo, 2019). It has been reported that the revenues (13% oil derivation) 
from the Federal Government to the states and the parastatals (Niger Delta 
Development Commission, Ministry of the Niger Delta, etc.) in the region 
running into billions of naira for over the years has been mismanaged by 
their leaders (Bodo & David, 2018; Bodo, 2018). Many have also ascribed 
the backwardness of the Niger Delta region to the corruptness of their 
leaders (Bodo, 2019). 
 
Conclusion 
Oil crisis in the Niger Delta is saddled and fuelled by negligence, 
failed promises, and corruption in the part of the government and the 
operating oil companies to the people of the Niger Delta. Delays in meeting 
the basic needs and demands of the people have resulted in a state of 
anarchy and more devastation of the ecosystem. The revenue that accrues to 
the state has been reduced over time due to the activities of illegal oil 
bunkering, pipeline vandalism, and diversion of petroleum products by oil 
thieves. Several injustices done to the people such as the persistence 
killings and militarisation of region, refusal to implement UNEP 
recommendations in Ogoniland, and the lack of human and social 
empowerment has aggravated the crisis on a daily basis. The people now 
show their grievances and displeasures of being marginalised through 
attacks on oil workers, military personnel, and oilfacilities. 
The government should ensure peace in the Niger Delta region by 
showing true concern to the plight of the people through action-oriented 
plans to meet their basic needs. The cleanup of Ogoni, as recommended by 
UNEP in 2011, and the employment of thousands of youths whose 
livelihood has been lost due to oil exploration on their land will be a 
starting point. Furthermore, the government must earn the trust of the 
people by being truthful in their promises to them. Also, the government 
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should avoid making common and politicising environmental issues that 
borders on human life and the survival of the Niger Delta ecosystem. 
Environmental protection and literacy should start from the Nigerian 
government and then be inculcated into the people of the Niger Delta. The 
environmental consciousness of citizen is the beginning of sustainable 
development. 
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